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EXPEDITIONARY ASW 
• • MARINE CORPS, 
AND L ANDERS COLLIN FOX, 
DYLAN PHILLIPS-LEVINE, AND 
TREVOR PHILLIPS-LEVINE, U.S. NAVY 
The Marine Corps needs to 
develop new capabilities to 
support the Commandant's 
call to play a role in ASW. 
After HMS Conqueror sent the Argentin• ian cruiser General Belgrano and 323 
. Argentine sailors to their final resting 
place on 2 May 1982, the remainder of 
Argentina's fleet retreated to home waters-
all except the submarine San Luis. Argentina 
hoped this lone diesel boat, marginally func. 
tional and half.crewed, could avenge the Gen• 
era/ Belgrano and turn the tide of the war by 
sinking a British aircraft carrier. 1 
Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of 
the Royal Navy's task force during the Falk• 
lands War, keenly appreciated this threat: Los· 
ing either of his two carriers could lose the war 
for Britain. In response, Woodward deployed 
11 destroyers, 5 nuclear submarines, 1 diesel 
submarine, and 25 helicopters in the most in• 
tense submarine hunt in modem history, ex. 
pending 6,847 flight hours and SO lightweight 
torpedoes in a failed attempt to sink the San 
Luis.1 Still, the submarine eventually made 
three ineffective attacks, including one against 
a British carrier, before withdrawing because 
of mechanical failures. 3 
The Falklands campaign revalidated Sa. 
viet Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov's obser• 
vation that antisubmarine warfare (ASW) re• 
quires large numbers of ships and aircraft to 
counter each enemy submarine. He noted the 
Allies deployed 25 ships and I 00 aircraft for 
each German submarine they faced during 
World War 11.4 While ASW technology has im• 
proved since the Falklands War, submarines 
have become stealthier, more widely prolifer• 
ated, and better armed. Today, ASW continues 
to demand disproportionate resources. 




The P-8A n1aritime patrol aircraft is a very cap;:ible 
replacement for the P-3 Orion. but the N;:ivy is not 
purchasing enough to cover the vast distances in 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
But, despite a more challenging ASW environment, 
the U.S. Navy fields proportionally fewer dedicatedASW 
platforms than it did in World War II or the Cold War. 
Modem ASW tools have greater capability, but there 
are not enough to protect a global fleet against dozens 
of hostile submarines. Consequently, scarce ASW plat-
forms need to be optimally placed, well•protected, and 
welt.supported to be effective. Marine Corps Cornman• 
dant General David H. Berger has advocated in broad 
terms for Marines in expeditionary advanced bases 
(EABs) to support future ASW operations, writing: "The 
undersea fight will be so critical in the High North and 
the western Pacific that the Marine Corps must be part of 
it."~ There are multiple ways the Marines can make the 
Commandant's vision a reality. 
THE THREAT 
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues 
to mature its diesel·electric and nuclear•powered subma• 
rine fleets, with a goal of at least parity with the West-or 
even becoming the premier submarine force of the world. 
Analysts project that China's submarine fleet will numer· 
ically exceed the U.S. fleet by 2030, while its quality will 
continue to improve.6 In their authoritative book, Red 
Star Over the Pacific, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes 
warn of the increasingly large and capable Chinese sub• 
marine force: 
Over the past two decades, modem diesel submarines-diffi-
cult to detect, track, and target in shallow offshore water 
have slid down the ways at Chinese shipyards or been pur-
chased in significant numbers from Russian suppliers.1 
A 2015 RAND Corporation study indicated that the 
opportunity for submarine attack against a .S. carrier 
strike group increased by an order of magnitude from 
1996 to 2010 and projected the capability to increase 
by yet another order of magnitude by 201 7. 8 In 2018, 
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Chinese President Xi Jinping personally addressed a 
new generation of submarine crews, saying: 
Submarine forces are a key instrument of our nation and 
therefore must be given priority and make big strides in their 
development. ... We pin our hopes on you to make rapid im-
provements in our Navy and its submarine forces. 9 
Western analysts also have noted that China continues 
to expand its shipyards, enabling the country to ramp up 
submarine production in the coming years. 10 
The submarine threat to the U.S. Navy's sea control 
and power projection forces (aircraft carriers in partic• 
ular) remains critical. Captain Wayne Hughes and Rear 
Admiral Robert P. Girrier's book, Fleet Tactics and Na• 
val Operations, reminds us that 15 aircraft carriers were 
sunk by submarines in World War II, a tally that nearly 
equaled the tonnage of carriers sunk by aircraft. 11 Ar· 
gentine forces possessed the potential to derail the en• 
tire British Falklands campaign with a single submarine. 
What effects would 76 Chinese submarines have in a 
great power conflict?12 
EXISTING CAPABILITIES 
At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had 227 op-
erational p.3 OrionASW aircraft, organized in three dozen 
squadrons around the world. ') The p.3 fleet dwindled, as 
first the "peace dividend" at the end of the Cold War and 
then the war on terror made hunting submarines seem less 
relevant. The number declined to 13 7 by 20 I 0. The last ac• 
tive•duty P-3 squadron retired its aircraft in 2019, and the 
follow-on P·SA is slowly ramping up. The Navy has set a 
requirement for 138 P·SAs, but as of late 2019, only Ill 
were actually under contract. 14 The Navy will supplement 
the P-8As with MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), but these also will be spread very thinly. 
Even though the P·SA is very capable, it will end up a 
high.demand, low•density asset. The United States fields 
291 MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, and while these "Ro-
meos" provide important shipboard ASW capability for 
prosecution and point defense, they lack the range, pay-
load, and on-station time of the Boeing 737-derived 
P-8s. In any global conflict, P-8s would be spread thin 
protecting U.S. surface vessels. Even with 291 helicop-
ters, it is not clear the Navy could meet the density of 
ASW assets (25 ASW helicopters) the Royal Navy de-
ployed during the Falklands campaign without stripping 
protection from other regions. 15 
Also, the U.S. surface fleet is less capable in ASW 
than it should be, suffering from a similar distraction 
and warfighting atrophy as the Navy's airborne ASW 
fleet. The Navy decommissioned the last of its frigates 
more than five years ago, and the littoral combat ships' 
ASW mission modules have struggled to satisfy the prob-
lem-plagued platform's restrictive weight requirements. 
Crucial systems are still in testing despite the first ship 
being commissioned more than a decade ago. 16 The mis-
sion modules are expected to be operational soon, but 
Constellation-class frigates will not join the fleet until the 
mid-to-late 2020s, leaving the surface fleet with a signif-
icant ASW gap at the same time as the Chinese subma-
rine fleet is expected to numerically surpass the U.S. sub-
marine fleet. While guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) 
and guided-missile cruisers (CGs) have robust ASW ca-
pabilities-including hull-mounted and towed-array so-
nars and the capability of embarking Romeos-DDGs 
are, like the P-8s, high-demand, low-density assets with 
commitments outside the Indo-Pacific theater and mis-
sions beyond ASW. The vast expanses of the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans demand far more than the 10 to 14 DDGs 
and cruisers available in Seventh Fleet. 17 
EXPEDITIONARY ASW, MARINE CORPS STYLE 
The joint force can address this ASW shortfall by us-
ing the Marines as extensions of the ASW bubble pro-
vided by DDGs and CGs. The Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps has turned this former interservice heresy into 
something approaching doctrine.18 
The Commandant's message is clear: ASW should be 
considered a cross-domain mission supported by Ma-
rines. Marines can do so by supporting Navy forces at 
expeditionary advanced bases. P-8s and MH-60Rs could 
forward deploy, increasing their distribution and reach 
within the battlespace. Marine logistics could sustain 
these aviation units with the fuel, lightweight torpedoes, 
and sonobuoys needed for the ASW fight. 19 Surface ships 
could launch intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance UAVs, including loitering munitions, under strict 
· emissions control for subsequent control handoff to Ma-
rines (known as remote-split operations), thereby extend-
ing maritime domain awareness without compromising 
surface forces. 
Beyond simply supporting the Navy's ASW opera-
tions, Marines also can be actively involved in the detec-
tion and prosecution of enemy submarines with their own 
small boats and aircraft, or even from land. 
Boats. Turning its focus toward the sea, the Marine 
Corps is considering acquiring a fleet of Metal Shark 
long-range unmanned surface vessels (LRUSVs).20 De-
spite the vessel's small size, the LRUSV could be fit-
During the Falkland Islands War, the Royal Navy deployed 
numerous multipurpose helicopters for antisubmarine war-
fare duty, Including Sea King (left) and Wessex aircraft, as 
well as a variety of ships and a submarine. 
ThP Army Is tcst1r1c1 c111tisl11p WP,1Irnn, with the H1MARS 
rocket systcr11. i 11cl ud, riq t lie Loe kiH'C'll Pr c·cis1011 -Str rke 
Missile shown here. I Ile unclerlvi11q rocket could Ile 
act~ptccl to c,irry li[Jl1twc1[Jl1t torpedoes us well 
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ted with conventional miniaturized ASW sensors such 
as thin-lined, towed arrays (TLTAs) and hull-mounted 
sonars or deploy smaller unmanned systems. In fact, 
during 2016's Operation Unmanned Warrior, four wave 
gliders successfully tracked a submarine using a Krait-
Array TLTA.21 Also, LRUSVs could employ the small, 
lightweight torpedoes known as compact rapid attack 
weapons (CRAWs), making them an effective pounce 
platform for any Chinese submarines detected in their 
areas of operation. Capable of full autonomy, the vessels 
could be optionally manned with sailors and Marines to 
adjust the payload for the wide spectrum of ASW mis-
sions, including sensor deployment, target tracking, and 
target prosecution. 
The LRUSV, however, is simply one option of many 
small craft available. The Coast Guard's modem fast re-
sponse cutters would also make a good manned platform 
for an ASW suite. The Marine Corps could also procure 
manned patrol boats that would be good candidates for 
ASW missions. Larger patrol boats would have advan-
tages over LRUSVs in range and payload capacity. 
MV-22s. The Marine Corps' MV-22s are ideal candi-
dates for enabling expeditionary ASW from EABs. Tilt-
rotor aircraft could revolutionize ASW. The ability to 
land and take-off from austere locations provides a sig-
nificant tactical advantage, because these aircraft do not 
need vulnerable fixed runways like the P-8 (which re-
quires a mile or more of paved runway to take oft). While 
Marines might sustain P-8s forward, the planes would be 
based primarily outside contested areas, which increases 
the P-8s' transit time to operational areas. The MV-22's 
faster speed, longer endurance, and midair refueling ca-
pability would make it better a ASW platform than the 
MH-60R Seahawk the Navy currently operates. 
In October 2020, Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163, a 
Marine Corps MV-22 squadron, deployed oceanographic 
sensors and buoys that demonstrated its usefulness in this 
role.22 Also, Bell Flight's developmental tiltrotor aircraft, 
the unmanned V-247 Vigilant, touts antisubmarine war-
fare as a potential mission. 23 
Cross-Domain Fires. Ground-based fires are an-
other way Marines could help fight submarines. The Ma-
rine Corps plans to increase its HiMARS missile artil-
lery numbers by 300 percent and to develop a variant of 
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle that can carry antiship 
missiles.24 Along the same lines, the Army has demon-
strated and continues to develop capabilities for its rocket 
artillery. As a complement to these antisurface weap-
ons, the Marine Corps could mate the CRAW with Hi-
MARS-fired Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(GMLRS) rounds to give its new littoral regiments a po-
tent antisubmarine weapon. The Marine Corps could use 
these long-range rocket artillery batteries to prosecute de-
tected submarines almost instantly. 
Current GMLRS rounds with CRAW-sized warheads 
already have almost triple the range of the existing ship-
launched RUM-139 antisubmarine rockets (75 km vs. 
28 km), but the CRAW/GMLRS advantage will soon in-
crease. The Army is investing to expand the GMLRS's 
range to 150 km and field the new Precision Strike Mis-
sile (PrSM), with a range of more than 500 km. 25 Mobile 
batteries with antiship and antisubmarine weapons would 
allow Marines to target any enemy vessel transiting criti-
cal chokepoints and littoral regions. 
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
Despite the Commandant's imprimatur, Marine Corps ef-
forts to participate in ASW face resistance. After General 
Berger published the Commandants Planning Guidance 
outlining future changes to the Marine Corps, Jim Webb, 
a former Marine and Secretary of the Navy, forcefully ar-
gued that the Marine Corps should not optimize itself for 
the Pacific to support naval missions. He wrote: 
After the centuries it took to establish the Marine Corps as 
a fully separate military service, it could reduce its present 
role by making it again subordinate to the funding and oper-
ational requirements of the Navy.26 
Asking the Marine Corps to fight submarines at sea-
historically a blue-water Navy mission-will certainly 
be met with skepticism by traditionalists from both the 
Navy and Marine Corps. But if the Marine Corps wants 
to stay relevant, it has to be willing to change and chal-
lenge the historical divisions oflabor among the Sea Ser-
vices. Even if the Marine Corps does pursue ASW, it will 
only be able to do so as a junior and supporting partner to 
the far better equipped Navy. 
TO THE SHORES OF EABs 
One of the most important lessons of the Falklands War 
is how seriously the U.S. Navy must take the submarine 
threat to its surface fleet. Although the Navy has recog-
nized the importance of ASW, it will need help, and the 
Marine Corps should stand ready to assist by embracing 
ASW as a complementary mission. 
The Marine Corps will not be directly involved with 
screening aircraft carriers or conducting deep-water ASW. 
But it could provide valuable capabilities in the littorals, 
and at key maritime chokepoints. The Marine Corps 
should develop multiuse capabilities that are compatible 
with the expeditionary advanced base operations concept 
for taking the fight to enemy submarines. General Jeremy 
Moore, commander of the British ground forces during 
the Falklands War, said of the conflict, "Only land forces 
could win the war, but the Navy could always lose it."27 
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